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Hate Is Enough
HOW NEW YORK’S BIAS CRIMES STATUTE HAS
EXCEEDED ITS INTENDED SCOPE
INTRODUCTION
On the night of Oct. 8, 2006, twenty-eight-year-old
Michael Sandy drove from his home in the Williamsburg
section of Brooklyn to a quiet stretch of beach near the Belt
Parkway.1 Sandy, a designer for a Long Island IKEA furniture
store, believed he was headed for a late night tryst with a man
he had met a short time earlier in an internet chat room.2
Instead, Sandy was set upon by a four teens who had
orchestrated the rendezvous in order to rob him.3
But the attackers’ scheme unraveled quickly. Instead of
handing over his cash, Sandy fled, and the young men pursued
him onto the Belt Parkway.4 Sandy was struck by a car,
suffering injuries that put him in a coma and eventually killed
him.5 Three of the teens, John Fox, 19, Ilya Shurov, 20, and
Anthony Fortunato, 20, were charged with felony-murder as a
hate crime.6 A fourth, Gary Timmins, 16, would plead guilty to
attempted robbery as a hate crime in exchange for his
testimony against the others.7
The hate crime statute used against the four defendants
in Fox was not new. With the passage of the Hate Crimes Act of
2000,8 New York State joined the growing number of states
with criminal statutes designed to deter and punish crimes
1

Jamie Schram, John Doyle & Dan Mangan, Gay ‘Bias’ Victim Clinging to
Life—May Have Brain Injuries from Mugging and Hit-Run, N.Y. POST, Oct. 10, 2006, at 17.
2
See People v. Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d 627, 631 (Sup. Ct. 2007), aff’d on other
grounds sub nom. People v. Fortunato, 903 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Div. 2010).
3
Id. at 631-32.
4
Id. at 632.
5
Id.
6
Alex Ginsberg & Larry Celona, ‘Hate’ Gets Redefined in Gay Slay, N.Y.
POST, Oct. 26, 2006, at 6.
7
See Inmate Information, N.Y. STATE DEPT. OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES,
http://nysdocslookup.docs.state.ny.us/GCA00P00/WIQ3/WINQ130 (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
8
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 485.00-485.10 (Consol. 2010).
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motivated by bias.9 The statute increases penalties for certain
enumerated crimes in situations where the victim is selected or
the crime is committed based upon a belief or perception
regarding age, sex, race, national origin, sexual orientation, or
a host of other listed characteristics.10 The effect of a conviction
for an enumerated crime, plus the hate-crime element, is to
increase the sentencing parameters for the base offense,
generally by one sentencing class level.11 The difference can be
significant. An assault resulting in serious physical injury,
normally a “D” felony, punishable by no more than 7 years in
prison, becomes a “C” felony, punishable by up 15 years.12
As the Sandy case progressed, details emerged that
underscored the tension between the statute’s language and its
legislative intent. Perhaps most surprising, defendant
Fortunato pursued a trial defense that included evidence that
he himself was homosexual.13 Accordingly, the picture of the
defendants, as a group, that slowly took shape was not that of a
quartet of vitriolic gay-bashers overcome by animus, but rather
of four extraordinarily cold and calculating thieves looking for
easy money to buy drugs.14 Because this picture did not fit the
stereotypical “hate crime” pattern, the defendants made a
pretrial motion for dismissal based on the argument that the
hate crime statute could not be applied to a case where no
actual “hate” was alleged.15
The Sandy defendants were attempting to draw the
court’s attention to a subtle distinction in hate crime law—that
between “pure hate” crimes and “opportunistic bias” crimes. The
first type needs little explanation; these are offenses involving
9

See, e.g., Bane Act sec. 7, § 422.75, 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 607; Act of Apr. 21,
1988, sec. 4, § 939.645, 1987 Wis. Sess. Laws 348.
10
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05(1).
11
Id. § 485.10(2). Criminal offenses in New York State are categorized by
offense levels designated by a letter of the alphabet that corresponds to a particular
range of penalties. Id. § 70.00(2).
12
See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.05, 70.00.
13
John Marzulli, ‘I Was Leading Double Lives,’ Says Brooklyn Slay Suspect,
DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 2, 2007, at 14. The evidence was adduced for the purpose of
arguing to the jury that Fortunato could not have “hated” Sandy, despite the fact that
the statute has no such requirement. Id.
14
John Marzulli, Gays ‘Easy to Get’—Bias Slay Suspect, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.),
Sept. 26, 2007, at 19 (“And he [Fortunato] was telling us how like it’s easy to get them
once you talk to them. . . . They’ll come and meet you, and we were gonna do it for the
money.”).
15
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Fortunato’s Motion to
Dismiss the Hate Crime Charges, at 1-2, People v. Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct.
2007) (No. 8607/06).
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palpable and virulent animus towards a particular group or
demographic. Crimes of the second kind, on the other hand, are
not motivated by any negative feelings towards the group or
demographic, but nonetheless constitute offenses that fit some
statutory definitions of hate or bias crimes. Generally, these
offenses are motivated by a perception regarding the victim’s
group that leads the perpetrator to believe that the particular
victim is an easy or convenient target for the crime. Examples
might include muggers who believe that women are less likely to
fight back than men, or burglars who believe that South Asians
keep large amounts of cash and jewelry in their homes. In each
case, the perpetrator demonstrates no hate towards the group;
he might in fact conceivably be a member of the group.16
At first blush, New York State’s Hate Crimes Act
appears unconcerned with this distinction. It does not require
that the defendant be motivated by “hate” or “animus” as those
terms are commonly understood. The law asks only that
prosecutors prove that the defendant intentionally selected the
victim or committed the crime “because of a belief or perception
regarding the race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender,
religion, religious practice, age, disability or sexual orientation
of a person.”17 That language is sufficiently broad to include two
interpretations of the events in Fox: that the defendants
targeted Sandy because they hated gays, or, alternatively, that
they singled him out based on the belief that he would not
resist or report the crime. Accordingly, the trial court denied
the Sandy defendants’ motion to dismiss the hate crime
charges.18 The decision was sound, at least insofar as the
language of the statute was so clear as to leave no opportunity
for an exploration of legislative intent.19
This note argues that the legislators who enacted the
Hate Crimes Act had no affirmative intent to include crimes of
opportunistic bias within its scope. The primary evil against
which its drafters hoped to strike a blow was traditional, “pure
hate” bias crimes. Nevertheless, it has been applied to fact
patterns well outside the traditional “pure hate” scenario; the Fox
case is both the most newsworthy and most dramatic example. As
16

For an in-depth discussion of the distinction, and why opportunistic bias
crimes should be punished as forcefully as traditional hate crimes, see Lu-in Wang,
Recognizing Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1399 (2000).
17
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05.
18
Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
19
Id. at 634.
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a result, the Hate Crimes Act confers on prosecutors strong power
to punish a wider array of offenses than intended, grants
unnecessary license to law enforcement, threatens the legislature’s
primacy as the state’s law-creating body and leads to unequal
application of those laws across jurisdictions.
Part I begins with a brief history of bias crimes statutes
in general and a review of the unsuccessful challenges to them.
Part II examines the New York statute in detail, including the
legislative intent as evidenced through legislative materials,
public statements, and news reports. Part III provides an
expansive review of New York cases in which the law appears
to have been applied to fact patterns outside the scope of this
discerned intent. Finally, Part IV concludes with a discussion
of the problems created by the Hate Crimes Act, and argues
that the best solution to these problems is for the legislature to
change the language of the statute.
There is certainly room for reasonable people to disagree
about the proper scope of a hate crime statute and whether it
should embrace crimes of opportunity in addition to crimes of
pure hate. Nevertheless, this note is not concerned with such
normative questions. This note seeks only to determine whether
the scope of the law, as it is currently understood, is consistent
with the understanding of the drafters in 2000.
I.

HATE CRIME LAWS

This section will provide a brief overview of hate crime
and bias crime laws in the United States, beginning with the
first statutes in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It will outline
the most common challenges—legal and nonlegal—such laws
have faced and will conclude with an analysis of the most
common forms drafters employ in making these statutes part of
their jurisdiction’s code.
A.

History of Hate Crime Statutes

The hate crime statutes now on the books in nearly every
U.S. jurisdiction are largely creations of the last twenty-five
years.20 The first city to have devoted a specific unit in its police
department to investigating bias-related crimes was Boston,
which in 1978 was struggling with unrest resulting from court20

JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND
IDENTITY POLITICS 3 (1998).

2011]

HATE IS ENOUGH

1603

ordered desegregation of its public schools.21 The following year,
Massachusetts enacted a statewide civil rights law establishing
penalties for interfering with others’ civil rights, though the
statute did not specifically enumerate status characteristics—
such as race, gender or religion—of potential victims.22
In 1981, the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith
(ADL)23 promulgated a model hate crime statute made up of two
components: first, an institutional vandalism component,
specifically criminalizing intentional damage to houses of
worship, and second, an intimidation component, enhancing
penalties for base offenses like harassment.24 By 1985, seven
states had hate crime statutes of one kind or another, and by
1991, that number had reached 22.25 James B. Jacobs and
Kimberly Potter trace the actual birth of the term “hate crime”
to the introduction of the Hate Crimes Statistics Act in the
House of Representatives in 1985.26 The bill, which eventually
became law in 1990, required the federal government to keep
track of hate crimes.27
As of this writing, Wyoming is the only state without a
hate crime provision of any sort.28 Four other states—Arkansas,
Georgia, Indiana, and South Carolina—lack a hate crime
statute that enhances penalties for criminal offenses committed
as a result of hate or bias.29 At the federal level, Congress passed
the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act in 1994, which
21

Brian Levin, From Slavery to Hate Crime Laws: The Emergence of Race- and
Status-Based Protection in American Criminal Law, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 227, 237 (2002).
22
Id. (citing MASS. ANN. LAWS chap. 265, § 37 (LexisNexis 2010)).
23
The ADL is an anti-bigotry and civil rights advocacy organization formed in
1913. Its original mission statement specifically mentioned fighting “the defamation of the
Jewish people,” but also proclaimed the need “to secure justice and fair treatment to all
citizens alike and to put an end forever to unjust and unfair discrimination against and
ridicule of any sect or body of citizens.” Anti-Defamation League, About the Anti-Defamation
League, ADL CHARTER OCTOBER 1913, http://www.adl.org/about.asp?s=topmenuhtml (last
visited Feb. 20, 2011).
24
Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but Can Words
Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation
Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV. 333, 339 (1991).
25
Id.
26
JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 20, at 4.
27
Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140
(codified at 28 USC § 534 (2006)).
28
Anti-Defamation League, State Hate Crime Statutory Provisions, LEADERSHIP
CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS. (2008), http://www.civilrights.org/publications/hatecrimes/
appendix-a.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
29
Id. Arkansas and Georgia provide civil remedies and criminalize
institutional vandalism; Indiana and South Carolina criminalize institutional
vandalism. Id.
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mandated an increase of at least three offense levels for federal
offenses committed out of hate or bias.30 The various statutes
differ in the array of characteristics which may form the basis
for a hate crime. All include race, religion, and ethnicity, but
characteristics such as gender and sexual orientation have yet to
be included in many of the statutes.31
B.

Challenges to Hate Crime Laws

Although this note focuses on objections to New York’s
criminalization of opportunistic bias crimes, New York’s law—
and those of other states that preceded it—have already been
subject to numerous criticisms and challenges. This section
briefly details those prior arguments against hate crime
legislation and how resolution of those arguments has, for the
most part, foreclosed their application in New York.
1. Overbreadth
When the first hate crime laws were enacted, the debate
surrounding them focused on whether they were overbroad
because they criminalized conduct protected by the First
Amendment—namely thought and speech. In Wisconsin v.
Mitchell,32 the United States Supreme Court confronted and
disposed of this issue, essentially preventing its exploration by
a New York court. Mitchell, a black youth, was convicted of
leading a bias-motivated gang assault and robbery of a white
man after having watched the film “Mississippi Burning,”
which depicts acts of hatred and discrimination by whites
against blacks in the 1960s.33 The jury heard evidence that
Mitchell yelled, “Do you all feel hyped up to move on some
white people?” and “You all want to fuck somebody up? There
30

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 280003, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. The federal statute requires discriminatory selection. Id.
§ 280003(b). Federal sentences are determined by reference to a chart, promulgated by
the United States Sentencing Commission, on which the “base offense level” of the
crime is matched with the criminal history of the defendant to arrive at a
recommended range of time of incarceration. Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual
Ch. 5 Pt. A (2010). The “base offense level” for every form of criminal conduct is laid out
in great detail elsewhere in the manual. Id. Ch. 2. Accordingly, any increase to the base
offense level will necessarily result in a higher recommended range.
31
Anti-Defamation League, supra note 28. Compare, for example, Illinois,
which includes sexual orientation, and Michigan, which does not. See § 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5112-7.1 (West 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.147b (West 2011).
32
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
33
Id. at 479-80.
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goes a white boy; go get him.”34 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
overturned the conviction, holding that the hate-crime statute,
which enhanced existing sentences in cases where a victim was
chosen for discriminatory reasons, impermissibly criminalized
racial views and preferences.35 That court further held that the
statute chilled free speech because it made citizens less likely
to express prejudicial thoughts, lest they be used as evidence
against them to prove discriminatory victim selection.36 But on
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that enhancing penalties based upon the defendant’s
motivation was not tantamount to the punishment of thought
or speech.37 The Court’s reasoning stemmed primarily from the
proposition that enhanced sentencing based on motive has
traditionally been within the authority of sentencing judges
and noncriminal anti-discrimination legislation.38
The decision does not necessarily rule out a different
result in New York. In theory, New York’s Court of Appeals
could interpret the nearly identical free speech provision of the
state constitution more liberally than the U.S. Supreme Court
did its federal counterpart.39 However, given the high court’s
ruling on the matter and the high level of acceptance hate
crime laws have attained across the country, such a possibility
would have to be considered remote. Some trial courts in New
York have addressed the issue, each time ruling against the
defendant.40 Furthermore, New York’s Office of the Attorney
General, which has a statutory right to intervene in criminal
proceedings in which the defendant contests the

34

Id. at 480.
State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 810-12 (Wis. 1992).
36
Id. at 172-73.
37
Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 484-85.
38
Id.
39
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (amended 2001) (“Every citizen may freely speak, write
and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right;
and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”).
40
See People v. Ivanov, 886 N.Y.S.2d 68 (table), 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7477,
at *8 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding the statute did not violate the First Amendment; the
defendant appears not to have raised a state constitutional claim); People v. McDowd,
773 N.Y.S.2d 531, 534 (Sup. Ct. 2005), aff’d 801 N.Y.S.2d 906 (App. Div. 2005); People
v. Amadeo, No. 3523/2000, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406, at *10-11, *14 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 1,
2001) (holding that no authority exists explicitly establishing that New Yorkers’ rights
under Art. I § 8 of the state constitution are different from their rights under the First
Amendment to the Federal Constitution).
35
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constitutionality of a statute,41 has taken the position that the
scope of free speech under the federal and state constitutions is
nearly identical, if not actually so.42
The likely unavailability of a judicial finding of
overbreadth has not entirely silenced critics whose objections
stem from concerns about government control of thought. Even
if hate crime statutes do no such thing, several scholars have
argued that, as a matter of policy, it is better not to even risk
discouraging bigoted thought through the criminal law.43
2. Vagueness
Another constitutional objection—vagueness—has not
yet been confronted by the Supreme Court.44 Nevertheless,
Oregon’s high court has considered the issue and found a hate
crime statute similar to New York’s sufficiently specific to
survive a vagueness challenge.45 Furthermore, several New York
trial level courts have considered and disposed of the issue.46

41

See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 71 (Consol. 2010). The statute is not clear as to
whether the Attorney General’s right of intervention applies exclusively to state
constitutional challenges, or both state and federal constitutional challenges. Id.
42
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Indictment
Counts for the Attorney General at 7, Amadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406.
43
See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 24, at 381 (“Beginning with the most basic of
values underlying the First Amendment, laws which limit or chill thought and
expression detract from the goal of insuring the availability of the broadest possible
range of ideas and expression in the marketplace of ideas.”).
44
The Supreme Court, in Mitchell, did not reach the defendant’s vagueness
claim, as it was not pressed in the court below and fell outside the scope of the grant of
certiorari. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 482 n.2 (1993).
45
See State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 561 (Or. 1992) (en banc) (“The crime
is defined in sufficiently clear and explicit terms to apprise defendant and others of
what conduct is prohibited.”). It should be noted, however, that the Oregon statute’s
wording is not identical to the New York statute. The Oregon statute refers to belief or
perception regarding the victim, OR. REV. STAT. § 166.165(1)(a)(A) (2010), while the
New York statute requires the same belief or perception regarding “a person,” N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 485.10 (Consol. 2010).
46
See, e.g., People v. Ivanov, 886 N.Y.S.2d 68, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7477,
at *8 (Sup. Ct. 2008); People v. Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d 627, 637 (Sup. Ct. 2007); Diaz, 727
N.Y.S.2d at 300-01. Nevertheless, there is an intriguing argument to be made for
vagueness, particularly with regard to statutes, like New York’s, that refer to the race,
religion, etc., of “a person.” As Susan Gellman has pointed out, such language leaves
open certain strange but entirely possible situations. For example, such a statute
might conceivably punish a white woman who attacks another white woman she
overhears using a racial slur on a black child. Gellman, supra note 24, at 355-56.
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3. Policy and Practice
Additionally, detractors have argued that hate crime
statutes of this sort do nothing to actually deter hate crimes,
but rather amount to an opportunity for legislators to “take a
stand” or “go on record” against prejudice.47 Alternatively, some
have predicted that even statutes worded so as to result in
equal prosecution of, for example, black-on-white violence as
white-on-black violence, would not be equally applied in
practice.48 These policy- and practice-based arguments against
hate crime laws are not as easily disposed of, for they rely, at
least in part, upon one’s perception of the political process. An
in-depth discussion of their validity is beyond the scope of this
note, beyond briefly noting that forty-five states have enacted
legislation of this variety.49
C.

Categories of Hate Crimes Statutes

Enacted hate crime laws take four basic forms: criminal
civil rights laws, civil causes of action, penalty enhancers, and
substantive crimes.50 Civil rights laws criminalize the
interference with the exercise of certain civil rights, for

47

See, e.g., JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 20, at 67 (“Politicians specialize in
symbolic pronouncements. They enthusiastically support laws that reaffirm widely
revered values such as ‘the flag,’ ‘patriotism,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘tolerance.’ Supporting hate
crime legislation provides them an excellent opportunity to put themselves on record as
opposed to criminals and prejudice and in favor of law and order, decency, and
tolerance.”); Editorial, Triangulating ‘Hate Crimes,’ N.Y. POST, Apr. 8, 1999, at 28 (“For
all their seemingly good intentions, hate-crime laws serve no purpose other than to
make their sponsors feel good about themselves. As weapons against hatred and
prejudice, they are worthless.”). The Fox defendants appeared to be sounding this note
in their motion to dismiss, arguing that unless the statute were narrowly construed to
require animus, “the charges are inapposite to the intent and purpose of the statute
and will be arbitrarily enforced not to protect sections of our community, but rather to
serve political motives.” Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Fortunato’s
Motion to Dismiss at 2, Fox, 884 N.Y.S.2d 627 (No. 8607/06).
48
See, e.g., Brian S. MacNamara, New York’s Hate Crimes Act of 2000:
Problematic and Redundant Legislation Aimed at Subjective Motivation, 66 ALB. L.
REV. 519, 537 (2003) (“Both the police and district attorneys are likely to bend in the
direction of the prevailing political winds; as one advocacy group gets louder, more bias
crimes against that group will be charged and prosecuted, adding further legitimacy to
that particular group’s claims of victimization.” (citing JACOBS & POTTER, supra note
20, at 20-21)). Interestingly, this concern appears to have taken hold on both the left
and the right. See Gellman, supra note 24, at 361 (expressing concern that a hate crime
statute might be applied disproportionately to black youths hurling anti-white
invective at police officers).
49
See supra Part I.A.
50
JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 20, at 29.
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example, school attendance or voting.51 Cause-of-action laws
give the victim of an alleged hate crime or a person whose
rights have been interfered with an opportunity to sue civilly
for damages.52 Penalty enhancers are criminal codes which
increase the punishment for certain enumerated crimes when
the finder of fact determines that the motivation was hate- or
bias-related.53 Finally, some jurisdictions define hate crimes
separately as independent, substantive crimes, rather than an
enhancement to other base crimes.54
It is the latter two varieties which are of primary
interest here. The distinction between penalty-enhancing
statutes and substantive-crime-creating statutes is primarily a
procedural one and not related to the focus of this note.
However, these types of statutes, taken as a group, divide in
another, more substantive fashion. As a rule, they are either
“discriminatory selection” statutes or “group animus” statutes.55
The former define a hate crime as any offense in which the
victim is selected for discriminatory reasons.56 The latter
further requires that those discriminatory reasons include
specific negative feeling or animus towards the group of which
the victim is perceived to have been a member.57 Thus, group
animus statutes criminalize a more specific subset of the
offenses targeted by discriminatory selection statutes.
Discriminatory selection statutes would proscribe any type of
bias crime—whether it be a crime of “pure hate” or an
opportunistic bias crime. Group animus statutes, on the other
hand, would only criminalize crimes of pure hate.58

51

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2006).
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51.7, 52, 52.1 (Deering 2010).
53
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.10 (Consol. 2010).
54
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.12 (LexisNexis 2010) (defining the
crime of “ethnic intimidation”). In practice, there is little difference between this
substantive crime and a penalty-enhancing statute like New York’s, as Ohio defines
“ethnic intimidation” in terms of several enumerated, previously existing base offenses.
55
FREDERICK LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN
LAW 29-30 (1999).
56
Id. As noted, New York’s hate crime statute is based on the discriminatory
selection model. Lawrence cites other examples, most notably the Wisconsin statute, which
was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 190 (citing WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (1997)).
57
LAWRENCE, supra note 55, at 30. Lawrence cites, among others, New
Hampshire’s statute, which uses the operative language, because “of hostility towards the
victim’s religion, race, creed[, etc.].” Id. at 191 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (1997)).
58
This distinction will be discussed further infra Part III.
52
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THE NEW YORK STATE HATE CRIMES ACT OF 2000

At this point, a brief summary of the statute itself is
warranted. Part A will guide the reader through the basic
provisions written into the law. Part B will undertake a
comprehensive review of those provisions, with an eye toward
discerning the intent of the drafters with respect to the issue of
opportunistic bias crimes. Part B will also examine all relevant
external materials, including legislative and executive documents,
press reports, and letters from the public.
A.

Overview

With the passage of the Hate Crimes Act of 2000, New
York became the 44th state to enact a statute enhancing criminal
penalties for crimes committed out of bias or hate.59 The New York
statute was based in large measure upon the Wisconsin statute
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.60 The
law includes a wide range of characteristics as listed triggers:
“race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious
practice, age, disability[,] or sexual orientation.”61 It is similarly
wide ranging in the array of base offenses which can be enhanced
if a jury finds that bias or hate was the motivation.62 The
sentencing scheme generally provides that each base offense is
enhanced by one offense level.63
The main portion of section 485.05 of the penal law
contains two provisions outlining the basic contours of hate
crimes as defined in the law. The first specifies that a hate
crime is committed when the defendant commits an
enumerated substantive offense and selects the victim based
upon a belief or perception regarding any of the above-listed
characteristics.64 The second specifies that a hate crime is
committed when the defendant commits the enumerated
59

MacNamara, supra note 48, at 519.
Memorandum, Governor’s Program Bill No. 1RR, at 1 (2000); see also
William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary to Penal Law § 485.05 (McKinney Supp.
2002) (“In drafting its statute, New York was apparently guided by both a Wisconsin
statute whose constitutionality had been sustained and a model statute published by the
Anti-Defamation League (ADL).” (citation omitted)); MacNamara, supra note 48, at 523.
61
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05 (Consol. 2010).
62
Id. § 485.05(3). Scores of statutory offenses are listed, including the major
felonies of murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, arson, assault, and kidnapping.
63
Id. § 485.10. For Class A-1 felonies, a hate crime conviction increases the
minimum, but not the maximum.
64
Id. § 485.05(1)(a).
60
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substantive offense because of such a belief.65 Put more simply,
to be a hate crime, discriminatory selection may be behind
either the choice of victim or the decision to commit the crime
at all.66 Neither provision requires that the belief or perception
must regard the victim in particular; both sections use the
language “belief or perception regarding the [listed
characteristics] of a person.”67 This appears to allow application
to cases of mistaken identity, in much the same way that many
states’ intentional murder statutes require intent to kill a
person—but not necessarily the same person who dies.68
The statute also includes additional evidentiary and
definitional material.69 It specifically indicates that proof of the
characteristics of the defendant, the victim, or both is legally
insufficient to prove the hate crime motivation.70 The statute
also defines two terms as used in the list of characteristics: age
(“sixty years old or more”)71 and disability (“a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity”).72
Finally, one unusual feature of the statute is the
inclusion of legislative findings in the actual text of the law.
Section 485.00 outlines the legislature’s rationale and goals in
passing the law, listing, in particular, a finding that hate
crimes have increased substantially in recent years and that,
by their nature, they cause harm to entire communities.73 In
large part, it was the inclusion of these legislative findings that
prompted the Fox defendants to make their argument for a
limitation on the scope of the law.74
B.

Legislative Intent

As noted, the text of section 485.05 makes no distinction
between crimes of pure hate and crimes of opportunity. In
65

Id. § 485.05(1)(b).
Legislative materials explain that the second subsection was included to
cover crimes where the perpetrator clearly exhibits group animus, but where no
particular victim is intentionally selected—such as firebombing a predominantly black
church without knowing who, in particular, is inside. Memorandum, Governor’s
Program Bill No. 1RR, at 2 (2000).
67
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05(1)(a)(b) (emphasis added).
68
See, e.g., id. § 125.25.
69
Id. § 485.05.
70
Id. § 485.05(2).
71
Id. § 485.05(4)(a).
72
Id. § 485.05(4)(b).
73
Id. § 485.00.
74
People v. Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d 627, 633 (Sup. Ct. 1997); see also infra Part II.B.6.
66
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requiring simply that the victim be selected, or the crime be
committed, because of a belief or perception regarding a
person’s race, religion, or other characteristics, it embraces
both traditional hate crimes and more nuanced fact patterns,
such as the Sandy case, that invite categorization as
opportunistic bias crimes. In fact, section 485.05 has been
applied across a wide spectrum of crimes, from those as
nebulous as the Fox case to those as clear cut as “race war”
murderer Phillip Grant.75
Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that the
drafters of the Hate Crime Act intended so broad a scope. A
review of the legislative history suggests that crimes of pure
hate were the primary types of offenses the legislature sought
to punish with this statute. At the very least, the legislative
history tells us that the crimes-of-hate/crimes-of-opportunity
distinction was a nuance that escaped most of the public debate
and discussion on the bill.
A few words about legislative intent are in order before
we examine the statute and its history. In declining to engage in
an exhaustive examination of the Hate Crimes Act’s legislative
history, the Fox court averred, “the hate crimes charges in this
case are consistent with the intent of the Legislature as
manifested by the plain language of Penal Law § 485.05(1)(a).”76
In other words, a court need not engage in an examination of
legislative history, nor draw on rules of construction, nor delve
into the contemporary political or social controversies that
surrounded enactment of the statute, if the statute itself is
unambiguous.77 Invocation of this simple, rational, and wellestablished rule shortened the court’s task in Fox.
75

Philip Grant, an African-American man, was charged with waiting in a
Westchester mall stairwell for hours before fatally stabbing Concetta Russo-Carriero,
who was white. Grant later told investigators that he wanted to start a “race war” and
that “the first person I see in this mall that looks white, I’m killing. . . . As long as she
had blond hair and blue eyes, she was going to die.” Lisa W. Foderaro, Murder Suspect
Told Police He Hunted a White Woman, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at B3.
76
Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
77
See N.Y. STAT. § 76 (McKinney 2011) (“Where words of a statute are free
from ambiguity and express plainly, clearly and distinctly the legislative intent, resort
may not be had to other means of interpretation.”); 97 N.Y. JUR. STATUTES § 104 (“As
the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any
case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain
meaning thereof. . . . Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts
must give effect to its plain meaning. . . . Generally, the unambiguous language of the
statute is alone determinative. Where words of a statute are free from ambiguity and
clearly express the legislative intent, resort may not be had to other means of
interpretation such as the rules of construction, for courts should not interpret what
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This note, however, seeks to conduct just such a farreaching analysis. It is well-established that where the
statutory text is not clear, where the plain language does not
spell out the legislative intent, resort may be had to all manner
of supporting materials, including legislative memoranda,
public statements, and floor debates.78 Because the task here is
to ascertain the legislature’s true intent—putting aside
presumptions about the unambiguous statutory language—this
note will consider all possible sources that shed light on the
intended scope of the Hate Crimes Act.
1. The Statute
Entitled “legislative findings,” section 485.00 precedes
the actual statutory definition of the crime and provides the
reader of the Penal Law with an unusual statement of purpose
by the legislature.79 Only two other sections of the Penal Law
include the legislative findings in the actual text of the
statutes: the enterprise corruption statute, the state’s analog to
federal RICO provisions, and the state anti-terror law.80
has no need of interpretation.”); Rochester Cmty. Sav. Bank v. Bd. of Assessors, 669
N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1009-10 (1998).
78
See generally, 97 N.Y. Jur. Statutes §§ 105, 114, 146, 148.
79
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.00. The full text of the findings are as follows:
The legislature finds and determines as follows: criminal acts involving
violence, intimidation and destruction of property based upon bias and
prejudice have become more prevalent in New York state in recent years. The
intolerable truth is that in these crimes, commonly and justly referred to as
“hate crimes”, victims are intentionally selected, in whole or in part, because
of their race, color, national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious
practice, age, disability or sexual orientation. Hate crimes do more than
threaten the safety and welfare of all citizens. They inflict on victims
incalculable physical and emotional damage and tear at the very fabric of free
society. Crimes motivated by invidious hatred toward particular groups not
only harm individual victims but send a powerful message of intolerance and
discrimination to all members of the group to which the victim belongs. Hate
crimes can and do intimidate and disrupt entire communities and vitiate the
civility that is essential to healthy democratic processes. In a democratic
society, citizens cannot be required to approve of the beliefs and practices of
others, but must never commit criminal acts on account of them. Current law
does not adequately recognize the harm to public order and individual safety
that hate crimes cause. Therefore, our laws must be strengthened to provide
clear recognition of the gravity of hate crimes and the compelling importance
of preventing their recurrence.
Accordingly, the legislature finds and declares that hate crimes should be
prosecuted and punished with appropriate severity.
Id.
80

See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00, 490.00 (2011).
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Two passages in the legislative findings are at least
arguably inconsistent with the statutory definition that follows.
First, the findings refer to victims being selected “because of
their race, color, national origin, [etc.]” rather than, as it is
phrased in section 485.05, “because of a belief or perception
regarding the race, color, national origin, [etc.].”81 The section
485.05 phrasing quite clearly employs language evincing an
intent to include situations where perpetrators are motivated
by such prejudicial beliefs—situations such as the perception in
Fox that a gay victim would make an easy mark. The section
485.00 language, however, is more ambiguous; it lends itself to
both that expansive interpretation but also the narrower,
traditional, “pure hate” construction.82
Second, and more significantly, the legislative findings
make reference to “[c]rimes motivated by invidious hatred
toward particular groups.”83 There is no ambiguity there. The
American Heritage Dictionary defines “invidious” as “tending
to rouse ill will, animosity, or resentment,” or “containing or
implying a slight.”84 If the use of the word “hatred” alone was
not clear enough, its modification with the term “invidious”
provides certainty that the drafters of this law envisioned its
application to gay bashing and other pure hate attacks.85
There is also a third passage that is instructive with
respect to the intended scope of the statute, one that might
easily be overlooked because it is not truly a “passage.” It is the
act’s title. The title suggests rather strongly that the harm to
be remedied here was “hate”—not misperceptions, stereotypes,
or even bias. There is a credible argument to be made that the
statute’s title is a valid indicator of the law’s legislative intent.
It is well established that courts in New York State are
instructed to discern legislative intent through a contextual
81

Id. §§ 485.00, 485.05 (emphasis added).
The language employed in section 485.00, by its omission of the words
“belief or perception regarding” found in section 485.05, invites a common-sense
reading: a victim who is selected “because of” his race is, in most people’s
understanding, the victim of a hate crime.
83
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 485.05.
84
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 949 (3d
ed. 1992).
85
Courts in New York routinely interpret statutes so as to accord significance
to every word. See Toys “R” Us v. Silva, 89 N.Y.2d 411, 420 (1996) (construing
discontinuation of “‘substantially’ all the nonconforming use[s]” to mean something less
than complete cessation of nonconforming uses), rev’g Toys “R” Us v. Silva, 229 A.D.2d
308, 310 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep’t. 1996) (“A basic rule of statutory construction
requires that meaning and effect be given to every part and word of the statute.”)
(Kupferman, J., dissenting).
82
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prism, taking into account all the facts and circumstances
surrounding its passage.86 In its affirmation as intervenor in
People v. Amadeo,87 the Attorney General examined the Hate
Crimes Act’s title in just such a fashion, interpreting “context”
to include the title of an act as well.88
2. Supporting Documents
The legislative materials relevant to the Hate Crimes
Act of 2000 are neither voluminous nor conclusively
illuminating. However, to the extent they are helpful in the
instant inquiry, they offer no indication that the bill’s drafters
or supporters envisioned the application of the law to extend to
opportunistic hate crimes. The Budget Report on the bill does
not mention the issue at all under “Arguments in Opposition,”
though it does summarize several other objections.89 The
Governor’s Memorandum in Support, in deconstructing section
485.05(2), states that this section, which establishes the
evidentiary burden to be met, “is designed to ensure that only
those who are truly motivated by invidious hatred are
prosecuted for committing hate crimes.”90
Letters included in the Governor’s bill jacket provide
additional insights into the law’s purpose. The Roman Catholic
Bishops of New York State, which opposed the bill, expressed
several reservations, including the loss of discretion by judges,
the potential for disparate application and the absence of
alternatives to incarceration.91 Only one issue raised by the
group even suggests superficial awareness of the crimes-of-

86

N.Y. STAT. LAW § 95 (Consol. 2010).
People v. Amadeo, No. 3523/2000, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406, at *1 (Sup.
Ct. Aug. 1, 2001).
88
Affirmation in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Indictment Counts at 9 &
n.4, Amadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406 (No. 3523/2000). To be sure, the term “hate
crime” can also be understood more generally as embracing a wide variety of bias
offenses, but the Office of the Attorney General, the state’s chief law enforcement
agency, did not take that position in Amadeo. The Attorney General’s memorandum of
law is discussed more fully infra Part II.B.6.
89
BUDGET REPORT ON BILLS, S. 4691a, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2000),
http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/images/images/96904.pdf (part of legislative packet
listing arguments in opposition, including the redundancy of such legislation and the
impropriety of punishing motivation or belief).
90
Memorandum, Governor’s Program Bill No. 1RR at 2 (2000).
91
Letter from the N.Y. State Catholic Conference to Members of the N.Y.
Senate (Apr. 3, 2000), available at http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/images/images/
96904.pdf (part of legislative packet; attaching a 1999 statement of the Roman Catholic
Bishops of N.Y. State).
87
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opportunity/crimes-of-hate problem: the bill’s “fail[ure] to
distinguish between an isolated offense and deep-seated bias.”92
Two important governmental bodies, in letters to the
Governor, expressed a clear view that the new law would
embrace only crimes of pure hate. In its letter expressing its
support for the measure, the Office of the Attorney General
appeared to take as a given that the statute was meant to
punish “hate,” noting,
[b]y employing this new law to the fullest, our government will send
a powerful message to victims and others like them that, regardless
of personal characteristics or lifestyle, they are valued members of
the community, and will make clear to victimizers that this state
does not tolerate hatred founded upon bias and prejudice.93

The Attorney General’s Legislative Bureau Chief could just as
easily have chosen the words, “this state does not tolerate bias
and prejudice.” Additionally, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s
legislative representative, Anthony Piscitelli, sounded a
virtually identical note, writing, “[e]nactment of this legislation
would also indicate to all New Yorkers that the New York State
Legislature is willing to act to provide solutions to help stem
the tide of hate motivated violence.”94
Eight letter writers cited notable hate crimes that
occurred elsewhere in the country shortly before the passage of
the Hate Crimes Act as examples of the “terrible occurrences” the
new law would prevent.95 The two incidents most commonly cited
92

Id.
Memorandum from Kathy Bennett, Chief, Legislative Bureau, Office of the
Att’y Gen., to James M. McGuire, Counsel to the Governor 2 (July 18, 2000) (emphasis
added), available at http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/images/images/96904.pdf (part of
legislative packet).
94
Letter from Anthony Piscitelli, Legislative Rep. to Mayor Giuliani, to George E.
Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. 2 (July 7, 2000), available at http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/
images/images/96904.pdf (part of legislative packet). Giuliani himself sounded a similar note in
the aftermath of a violent anti-Semitic rampage at a Jewish center in Los Angeles in 1999:
93

I understand, since I spent a lot of my life in law enforcement, that
legislation like the hate-crimes legislation doesn’t necessarily prevent an act
like this. It’s an after-the-fact punishment as opposed to something that could
be done before . . . But the statement is a very strong societal statement
against hatred and maybe over a period of time that could help wipe out this
irrational way of behaving.
Brendan Bourne et al., Racist Faces Death Penalty—Charged in Postal Slay and Kid
Shootings, N.Y. POST, Aug. 13, 1999, at 6.
95
Letter from Herbert I. Cohen, M.D., to Sen. Joseph Bruno (Mar. 12, 1999);
Letter from Doris Corrigan, State Committeewoman, to George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y.
(Mar. 16, 1999); Letter from Georgia K. Guida to George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. (Mar.
2, 1999); Letter from Amy Klein to George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. (Mar. 5, 1999); Letter
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in the letters are probably among the most infamous “pure hate”
acts of violence in the public consciousness: the dragging death of
James Byrd, Jr., by white supremacists in Jasper, Texas, in 1998,
and the beating death of gay University of Wyoming student
Matthew Shepard the same year in Laramie, Wyoming.96
3. The Assembly Bill
A different piece of hate crime legislation that was under
consideration contemporaneously offers some clues as to the
legislative intent behind the bill that was passed. 97 The bill that
became the Hate Crimes Act of 2000 originated in the Senate at
the behest of the Governor.98 By contrast, the Assembly had
passed its own bill during each of the previous eleven years, only
to see it fail in the Senate each time.99 The 1999-2000 legislative
session was no exception. The Assembly bill had passed the
Assembly and was—yet again—being denied a floor vote in the
Senate, when that body passed the Governor’s bill.100
There were significant differences between the two
pieces of legislation. Rather than enhancing sentences for
crimes where bias was a motive, Assembly bill A.1573 created a
separate crime of bias-motivated violence or intimidation.101
Like its Senate counterpart, it included legislative findings, but
from Robin S. Merrill to George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. (Mar. 10, 1999); Letter from
Helen Quirini to George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. (undated); Letter from Michael Rubinovitz
to George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. (Mar. 11, 1999); Letter from Herbert K. Reis, Esq., to
George E. Pataki, Gov. of N.Y. (Mar. 12, 1999). All letters are part of the legislative packet
and can be viewed at http://image.iarchives.nysed.gov/images/images/96904.pdf.
96
See sources cited supra note 95. Matthew Shepard, a 22-year-old, openly
gay University of Wyoming student, was beaten, burned, and tied to a fence in October
1998 after two men, pretending to be gay, approached him at a Laramie bar. James
Brooke, Gay Man Beaten and Left for Dead; 2 Are Charged, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998,
at A9. He succumbed to his injuries a short time later. James Brooke, Gay Man Dies
from Attack, Fanning Outrage and Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at A1. James
Byrd, Jr., a black man, was beaten and chained to a car by three white supremacists,
then dragged for some two miles to his death in June 1998. Carol Marie Cropper, Black
Man Fatally Dragged in a Possible Racial Killing, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1998, at A16.
97
Where the final version of a bill passed differs from an earlier version, a
court may infer that the drafters of the final version were aware of those differences
and consciously intended them. See Kimmel v. State of New York, 906 N.Y.S.2d 403,
408 (N.Y. App. Div., 4th Dep’t. 2010) (finding that final 1989 version of the Equal
Access to Justice Act was intended to have broader reach than the rejected 1982, 1983,
1984 and 1986 versions).
98
See Memorandum, Governor’s Program Bill No. 1RR (2000).
99
Liam Pleven, Analysis / By Any Means Necessary / Nassau Republicans
Support Liberal Bills to Win Votes, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 25, 2000, at A17.
100
Editorial, Taking Action on Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2000, at A14.
101
A.1573 § 4, 1999 Assem., 222d Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
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it differed in that it would have explicitly made the findings a
functioning part of the statute, thus eliminating the
uncertainty surrounding the purpose of the findings included
in the bill that was passed.102 In sum, the legislative findings
were included to guard against prosecutorial overreaching:
Section 1 of the bill required prosecutors to submit an
attestation to accompany the grand jury indictment averring
that he or she had found the grand jury review of the evidence
to be consistent with the legislative findings.103 Section 2 of the
bill gave defendants the right to move for dismissal on the
grounds that the application of the law in a particular case was
not consistent with the legislative findings.104 If those provisions
did not provide a clear enough indication that the Assembly
was concerned with over-application, its memo on the bill offers
an explicit rationale for the inclusion of the findings.105
None of this means that the framers of the Hate Crimes
Act of 2000—in the version that passed—intended anything
different. However, the existence of A. 1573 at least put the
Senate and the Governor’s legislative team on notice that the
issue of overreaching should be a concern. The legislature’s
decision not to include a similar provision in the enacted
legislation can be interpreted as a conscious decision to pass a
bill that folded opportunistic bias crimes within its purview.

102

See supra Part II.B.1.
A.1573 § 1. In other words, the bill would have imposed on prosecutors the
quasi-judicial duty to determine legislative intent and to circumscribe their own
charging decisions.
104
Id. § 2.
105
Memorandum on Provisions in the Bias Bill, A.1573, 1999 Assem., 222d
Sess. (N.Y. 1999) (“The bill includes a statement of ‘Legislative Findings.’ This
statement is intended to make it clear that it is not enough for the accused to merely be
of a different ethnic background, gender, physical condition or sexual orientation of the
victim for this statute to come into play. There must be a showing that the defendant
had the specific intent to deprive an individual or group of an enumerated civil right.”).
In explaining the structure and function of the proposed law to its critics on the
Assembly floor, its sponsor, Assemblyman Arthur Eve, engaged in the following
illuminating colloquy with colleague David Seaman:
103

Mr. Seaman: It has to be proven that it was done not because it was easier to
take the pocketbook away from the senior citizen—
Mr. Eve: That’s right.
Mr. Seaman:—but because there was some disregard for that senior citizen?
Mr. Eve: That’s right. Because of their age.
N.Y. Assembly Debate on Assembly Bill A.1573, at 16 (Jan. 19, 1999).
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4. Public Statements
The individual legislators who sponsored and voted for
the Hate Crimes Act offered the public various arguments in
its favor, though very few have any relevance to discerning
their intent as to the inclusion of crimes of opportunity in the
statute’s scope. To the small extent legislators’ public
statements were relevant to this issue, most appear to support
a pure-hate-only interpretation of the bill.106 The same
perceptions are evident in statements by other politicians
weighing in publicly on the bill’s merits.107
106

For example, when the bill was passed, State Senator Roy Goodman, a
Manhattan Republican who sponsored the bill in the Senate, told reporters that, “This
[bill] recognizes that a bias crime is a crime not committed against an individual but a
whole class of people,” while specifically mentioning hate-based gay-bashing incidents.
Tom Precious, After 11 Tries, State Senate Is Set to Pass Hate-Crime Law, BUFFALO
NEWS, June 7, 2000, at 8B. Goodman, addressing the Senate, was even less measured,
telling his Albany colleagues, “And I say to you that what we are attempting to deal
with here is some of the darkest and most tragic impulses which enter warped minds
who seek to take out vengeance upon specific groups . . . .” N.Y. Senate Debate on
Senate Bill S4691A, at 4533-34 (June 7, 2000).
The bill passed in 2000, in large part because Senator Joseph Bruno, the
majority leader who blocked the bill the previous eleven years, changed course and
agreed to support it—albeit grudgingly. Bruno told Newsday:
I don’t believe that a bias or hate bill by itself is going to do anything to
reduce crime. But I believe that the message that we’re focusing on people
who have malice in their hearts or hate or a bias towards an individual or
group. . . . [M]aybe the time has come for us to send that message out there.
Jordan Rau & Liam Pleven, Bias Bill Is Expected to Advance, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), June 7,
2000, at A07. Bruno’s faint praise evidenced a narrower view of the legislation as directed
strictly at hate, and he said much the same thing the same day in the Senate chamber
during floor debate: “I have a feeling still that this legislation is more perception than it is
substance.” N.Y. Senate Debate on Senate Bill S4691A, at 4530 (June 7, 2000).
On the other hand, not all legislators and public officials restricted their
view of hate crimes to offenses of pure hate. Then-state Senator David Paterson told
reporters in June 2000 that the spate of sexual assaults during the Puerto Rican Day
Parade that year were proper crimes to be charged under the statute. Thomas J.
Lueck, Manhattan: Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2000, at B8 (“The appalling
assaults that occurred following the Puerto Rican Day Parade in Central Park meet the
test.”). I presume here that Paterson meant that the hate crime statute could be
applied to the selection of the victims as women, not as non-Latinas. Nevertheless, in
either eventuality, there was no evidence of group animus in the assaults.
107
Westchester District Attorney Jeanine Pirro spoke out in favor of the law,
calling attention, with examples, to strictly hate-based incidents. Pirro told the New
York Times in a 2000 interview, “We’ve seen explosions in Westchester. We’ve seen
stabbings. We’ve seen people assaulted. We’ve seen people who just open their own
door and have someone say to them, ‘I don’t like people like you living in my country.
Go back to where you came from.’” Kate Stone Lombardi, County Arms Itself to Battle
Internet’s Messengers of Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, at 14WC. Even critics failed to
perceive—or at least were not concerned by—the possibility that crimes of opportunity
with little actual “hate” would be swept up by the statute. Conservative Party chair
Michael Long objected primarily to the bill’s creation—in his view, at least—of
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5. Public Debate and Media Coverage
Naturally, much of the public debate over the passage of
the bill took place on the opinion pages of the state’s major
newspapers. By and large—regardless of which side the writers
or editorial boards took—the understanding appears to have
been that the law would cover crimes motivated by hate. The
concept of opportunistic bias crimes seems not to have played
any role in the position of the print media.
Not surprisingly, those in favor of the bill chose to
highlight the most heinous and disturbing crimes of pure hate,
since such crimes would likely strike an emotional chord with
readers. Writing in the Daily News, for example, columnist Albor
Ruiz highlighted the killing of a gay, black Long Island teenager
by his white father as a horrific example of the type of offenses
the Hate Crimes Act would combat.108 A New York Times editorial
calling for the passage of a compromise bill that would reconcile
different Assembly and Senate versions clearly showed that the
Times’ editorial board believed the bill would punish—or at least
was meant to punish—only crimes of pure hate.109
One might reasonably expect that the bill’s opponents,
in particular, would perceive the bill to have criminalized
borderline conduct such as opportunistic bias crimes. Instead,
the opinion pages of newspapers opposing the legislation were
filled with wider objections to hate crimes in general.
Regarding efficacy, for example, one writer in the Daily News
suggested that the hate-crime “problem” was not as pervasive
as believed, and that similar legislation across the United
States had had little effect in combating it.110 Seeing the bill as
a monument to identity politics, the New York Post proclaimed,
“We may be a land of equal justice under law, but the

protected classes, telling the Buffalo News, “Isn’t the average person’s life and safety
worth just as much as a homosexual?” Precious, supra note 106. Long misapprehends
the bill’s even-handedness: the statute would punish equally an attack by gays on a
heterosexual whose sexual orientation was related to the crime’s motive.
108
Albor Ruiz, Horrific Slay May Revive Hate-Crime Legislation, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), March 30, 2000, at Suburban 4.
109
Editorial, Attacking Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2000, at A30 (“This
week the State Senate finally approved a bill that will increase punishments for those
convicted of crimes motivated by hatred.”).
110
Edward Lewine, Hate Law: Paper Tiger?, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), July 16,
2000, at 13.
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inescapable conclusion one draws from these laws is: Some
groups are more equal than others.”111
In fact, it was the rare commentator who perceived the
crimes-of-hate/crimes-of-opportunity distinction, and even then,
it appears only to have been singled out regarding sex crimes.
Only one news editorial came close to isolating the issue,
asking if heterosexual rapes would henceforth be prosecuted as
hate crimes.112
6. Court Interpretations
Ordinarily, appellate courts’ interpretations would
provide some of the best clues as to the legislative intent of a
statue and would, at any rate, constitute binding resolutions of
doubts as to a statute’s meaning.113 Unfortunately, the New
York appellate courts have had precious little opportunity to
contemplate the Hate Crimes Act. As of June 2011, the Court
of Appeals had done so in detail only once.114 The four Appellate
Divisions have decided only eighteen cases involving the
statute. None directly address the question of the statute’s
intended scope.115 With respect to the direct appeals of Fox and
Fortunato themselves, the former has not yet been decided, and
the latter did not raise any Hate Crimes Act-related issues.116
Of the trial courts that have discussed this issue,
however, as of the time of the writing of this note, only Fox
111

Rod Dreher, Is It a Hate Crime to Beat up Sickos in Sheets?, N.Y. POST,
Oct. 19, 1999, at 18. The context of the discussion was enhancement of the federal hate
crime statute to include sexual orientation, but the point was directed at hate crime
laws in general, and presumably the New York bill then under discussion in Albany.
112
See Editorial, Targeting Hate; Details to Come, BUFFALO NEWS, June 13,
2000, at 2B; The issue was, however, flagged by legal journalists. See Glenn Pincus,
Courts and Prosecutors Face New Hate Crime Act, N.Y. L.J, Sept. 21, 2000, at 1 (calling
the inclusion of sex crimes in the act “probably an unintended result calling for
considerable prosecutorial restraint and discretion”).
113
N.Y. STAT. LAW § 77 (McKinney 2011) (“The construction of a statute is a
question of law for the court and should not be submitted to the jury.”).
114
In People v. Assi, 928 N.E.2d 388 (N.Y. 2010), the Court of Appeals
addressed two issues not relevant to this note. First, the court held that the statute
applied to property crimes, despite the reference to “a person” in section 485.05. Id. at
391. Second, the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the statute had not yet taken
effect on October 8, 2010, the day of the events at issue, because it was a Sunday. Id. at
392. The Assi case is discussed further infra Part III.
115
The vast majority consider appeals of hate crime convictions, or their
Family Court equivalents, where the appellant argues that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. See, e.g., People v. Ortiz, 851 N.Y.S.2d 784 (App. Div. 2008); In
re Vanna W., 846 N.Y.S.2d 354 (App. Div. 2007).
116
People v. Fortunato, 903 N.Y.S.2d 910 (App. Div. 2010), leave to appeal
denied, 15 N.Y.3d 893 (2010).
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subjected this issue to a thorough analysis. As noted above,117 the
defendants in Fox claimed that that their selection of Sandy as
the victim of their criminal scheme was motivated by
opportunistic calculation, not hatred of gays, and thus fell
outside the statute.118 They pointed to the cooperating defendant
Gary Timmins’ grand jury testimony that defendant Fortunato
told the group that he had contacted and robbed gay men in the
past, and that “this was an easy way to rob someone.”119
In rejecting the defendants’ claim that their alleged
conduct fell outside the scope of the statute, the trial judge, Jill
Konviser, suggested that the defendants were, in effect, asking
the court to redefine the clear meaning of the statute.120 The
judge declined to do so, noting specifically that the inclusion of
the legislative findings in the statute—whatever its purpose—
did nothing to alter the clear language of section 485.05.121
Rather, she suggested an interpretation of the legislative
findings (and for that matter, the statute’s title) that did
considerably less violence to the law’s practical scope: that the
legislature, in including the language it did, made a finding
that opportunistic bias crimes were of equivalent odiousness to
crime of pure hate and thus could be subsumed under a statute
that mainly criminalized the latter.122
The Fox court did not subject the Hate Crime Act to
much scrutiny. This need not have been the case, since the trial
judge, having served as Governor Pataki’s Senior Assistant
Counsel from 1997 to 2002, was uniquely positioned to offer an
insider’s perspective on legislative intent.123 However, as the
judge herself pointed out in the Fox opinion, once the court
117

For a brief review of the facts of Fox, see supra Part I.
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Fortunato’s Motion to
Dismiss at 2, People v. Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (No. 8607/06) (“[T]hey did
so not because of any animus or prejudice against gays which is the heart and soul of
this legislation.”).
119
Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
120
Id. at 633 (“The defendants implicitly recognize that their conduct falls
within the plain language of the hate crimes statute and seek to avoid its implications
by asking this court to redefine a hate crime in a manner that would remove them from
the scope of the statute.”).
121
Id. at 633 & n.4.
122
Id. at 633 (“The Legislature, through its findings, therefore, made an
assessment that the intentional selection of a victim based on a protected characteristic
is tantamount to a crime motivated by bias, prejudice or hatred, thereby justifying
enhanced punishment.”).
123
See Judicial Directory—Hon. Jill Konviser, N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYS.,
http://www.nycourtsystem.com/Applications/JudicialDirectory/Bio.php?ID=7030086
(last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
118
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determines that the statute is clearly worded and
unambiguous, the court’s analysis is at an end.124 Therefore, any
further discussion of the legislative history of the Act would not
have been appropriate.125 In Fox, the court did take the extra step
of offering an explanation for the inclusion of the legislative
findings—namely, to justify enactment, communicate outrage,
and advance its goal of deterring bias crimes.126
Fox is the only reported case to have squarely
considered this issue. In fact, no judge has subjected the
statute to as searching a level of scrutiny. With respect to the
opportunistic bias crime issue, one Family Court assumed—
without citing authority—that the legislature could not
possibly have intended to include opportunistic bias crimes.127
In People v. Diaz, a Supreme Court128 remarked that the
legislative findings implicitly referenced historical injustices.129
Another, in People v. Amadeo, averred that opportunistic bias
crimes were “probably not even covered by the act.”130
Amadeo is also noteworthy because the court had at its
disposal not only the arguments of the parties, but also those of
the Attorney General, who retains a statutory right to
intervene where the constitutionality of a statute is in
question.131 In its brief, the Attorney General summarily
disposed of defendant Amadeo’s argument, sounding very much
like the Fox defendants:
The examples cited by the defendant, i.e. crimes against women and
against Asian shopkeepers based on their vulnerability as victims,
would arguably not fall within the ambit of the hate crimes statute

124

Fox, 844 N.Y.S.2d at 633 (“The governing rule of statutory construction is
that courts are obliged to interpret a statute to effectuate the intent of the Legislature,
and when the statutory ‘language is clear and unambiguous, it should be construed so
as to give effect to the plain meaning of [the] words’ used.” (citing People v. Finnegan,
647 N.E.2d 758, 760 (N.Y. 1995))).
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
In re John V., 820 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 n.3 (Fam. Ct. 2006) (“No doubt, the
Legislature did not intend the Hate Crimes Act to have such a reach—but it could.”).
128
In New York State, the trial-level criminal court with jurisdiction over
felonies is somewhat confusingly called Supreme Court.
129
People v. Diaz, 727 N.Y.S.2d 298, 300 (Sup. Ct. 2001) (“Implicit in the
findings, of course, is the acknowledgment of our shared pain from past crimes
committed against masses of peoples, groups, and individuals which unquestionably
were meant to target certain classes of people.”).
130
People v. Amadeo, No. 3523/2000, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406, at *12 & n.7
(Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 2001).
131
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1012(b) (Consol. 2010).
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unless the proof included evidence of some group-based animus
motivating the defendants.132

Unlike the Fox court, the Attorney General treated the
legislative findings in the Hate Crimes Act as a substantive
provision, and accordingly found that the findings precluded
application of the law to opportunistic bias crimes.133
7. Other Jurisdictions
Because New York enacted its hate crime statute so late
in relation to other states, the drafters had the ability to model
the statute based on the laws that existed in other jurisdictions.
A survey of state hate crime laws that existed at the time New
York’s Hate Crimes Act was under consideration shows that
several states had clearly modeled their statutes to require that
a defendant be motivated by hate or animus.134 Since these
models were available to the drafters, the inference can be
drawn that they made a deliberate decision to omit particular
language limiting the statute to crimes motivated by hate.
Nevertheless, an alternative explanation exists. The
drafters of the Hate Crimes Act used as their model the
Wisconsin statute upheld in Mitchell.135 Assuming for the
moment that the primary concern of the drafters was to
produce a statute that would not be struck down by a court,
their importation of the Wisconsin statute—even including its
ambiguities as to crimes of opportunity and crimes of hate—
makes perfect sense. In Mitchell, the Wisconsin statute
received the U.S. Supreme Court’s imprimatur; in the roughly
seven years following, no other potentially fatal flaws presented
132

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Indictment
Counts at 10, Amadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406 (No. 3523/2000). The defendant in
Amadeo was charged with knifing a man he believed to be Mexican on a subway
platform and, afterward, hurling ethnic slurs. Amadeo, 2001 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 406 at
*1-2. This conduct could not reasonably be classified as an opportunistic bias crime, but
the defendant nonetheless made the argument—unsuccessfully—that his due process
rights were violated by being prosecuted under a statute worded broadly enough to
include conduct not intended by the legislature. Id. at 11-12.
133
Id. (“Interpreting the statute in light of these findings would require that
the ‘belief or perception regarding’ the group to which a victim belongs . . . must include
a bias or prejudice against that group.” (internal citations omitted)).
134
LAWRENCE, supra note 55, at 191 (listing FLA. STAT ANN. § 775.085 (West
1995) (“commission of such felony or misdemeanor evidences prejudice based on the
race, color, [etc.]”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 22c, § 32 (1997) (“any criminal act coupled
with overt actions motivated by bigotry and bias”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (1997)
(“because of hostility towards the victim’s religion, race, [etc.]”)).
135
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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themselves. Viewed this way, the drafters’ choice to forego the
more specific language embodied in other states’ statutes
(language that would have clarified the ambiguities discussed
in this note), might reflect less a conscious choice as to the
statute’s scope than the simple possibility that the legislature
was constitutionally risk-averse.136
8. Summary
On balance, it is very difficult to say with certainty that
the legislature specifically intended to enact a statute that
folded within its scope opportunistic bias crimes. The
statements issued by its framers, other public officials, and the
public at large overwhelmingly suggest that pure hate was the
intended target of the statute. Although the one case on point,
Fox, unambiguously takes the opposite position, it does so more
as a matter of judicial restraint in statutory interpretation.
Other courts, as well as the Office of the Attorney General,
appear to disagree with Fox. Finally, the fact that the
Assembly bill was clearly written to exclude opportunistic bias
crimes does not mean that the Senate must have intended the
opposite, by its decision to pass a differently worded bill. Even
if the framers of the Senate bill intended to include
opportunistic bias crimes, there is strong evidence that most of
the legislators who voted for it and most members of the public
who supported it were unaware of that particular detail.
III.

APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK STATUTE OUTSIDE THE
BOUNDS OF PURE HATE CRIMES

Use of the Hate Crimes Act in New York State got off to
what appeared to be a problem-free start. On Sunday, October
8, 2000, the very day the law took effect and the day before
Yom Kippur, three Yonkers men fire-bombed a synagogue in

136

The Wisconsin statute, as amended in 1992, read in pertinent part:

intentionally selects the person against whom the crime . . . is committed or
selects the property that is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime . . . in
whole or in part because of the actor’s belief or perception regarding the race,
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of
that person or the owner or occupant of that property, whether of not the
actor’s belief or perception was correct.
Act of Apr. 30, 1992, 1991 Wis. Sess. Laws 291.

2011]

HATE IS ENOUGH

1625

the Riverdale section of the Bronx.137 The men, all ArabAmerican, told police they wanted to make a statement against
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.138 In large part,
it appeared to be just the sort of crime that the Hate Crimes
Act of 2000 was intended to punish.139
Nevertheless, not every crime in which section 485 was
used over the next nine years fit as conveniently into the
intended applications as did the firebombing attack. Two
similar incidents in which prosecutors drew diametrically
opposed conclusions and made different charging decisions are
illustrative of the degree to which the Hate Crimes Act is open
to interpretation. In 2004, a Queens special education teacher
was charged under the statute with scrawling the words
“nigger,” “fuck,” and “pussi” on the wall of a school restroom.140
The trial judge ruled that the charge could stand even though
the graffiti did not appear to be directed at any specific
victim.141 That same year, two Staten Island teens were
arrested for pouring gasoline in the shape of a massive
swastika in an intersection, then setting it ablaze.142 The
district attorney declined to bring hate crime charges,
explaining that those charges were not appropriate where a
particular victim could not be discerned.143 It is difficult to see
much significant difference between the two crimes on the issue
of whether a specific victim could be discerned; nonetheless, two
district attorneys made entirely opposite charging decisions.
137

Elissa Gootman, Hate-Crime Charges Filed in Vandalism of Synagogue,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2000, at B3. A fourth man was also arrested but not charged and
released pending further investigation. Id.
138
People v. Assi, 877 N.Y.S.2d 231, 234 (App. Div. 2009), aff’d 928 N.E. 2d.
388 (N.Y. 2010).
139
See supra Part II.B regarding the intent of the statute.
140
People v. Moorjaney, No. 2098/04, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 791, at *1 (Sup.
Ct. Mar. 24, 2006). Media accounts differ in the exact phrase scrawled, reporting it as
“nigger die.” See, e.g., Celeste Katz & Austin Fenner, Nab Teacher in Hate-Graffiti
Attack, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Mar. 13, 2004, at 2.
141
Moorjaney, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 791, at *4 (“[T]here was sufficient
evidence for the Grand Jury to conclude that the writer of the offensive words was
motivated by a perception of the person or persons who used the third floor female
bathroom; that would include, among others, all the people in the school, all the female
people in the school, [and] all the black female people . . . .”).
142
Ikimulisa Livingston, S.I. Swasti-Punks Duck ‘Hate’ Rap, N.Y. POST, July
9, 2004, at 19.
143
Id. (“‘Though the burning of the swastika was ‘insensitive, disgusting and
offensive to any sensible person,’ in this case it didn’t justify hate-crime charges
because it wasn’t aimed at any particular person or group,’ said Staten Island DA
Daniel Donovan. ‘The hate-crime statute as written by state legislators does not
support the filing of hate crime charges in this case,’ Donovan said.”).
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While cases such as the two outlined above underscore
the difficulty of applying the statute in a uniform fashion, it
was another 2004 Queens case that shows just how far the
envelope might be pushed in construing “hate.” Shirley Miller,
an alleged scam artist accused of fleecing four older, lonely men
out of hundreds of thousands of dollars by pretending to be
their sweetheart, found herself charged not simply with grand
larceny144—but grand larceny as a hate crime.145 Miller pleaded
guilty mid-trial in exchange for a four-month sentence.146
The Miller case is indicative of the particular
susceptibility of the “age” category in the Hate Crimes Act to the
prosecution of opportunistic hate crimes. Armed with this
powerful tool to enhance criminal penalties, prosecutors have
applied it zealously to cases where the facts fit the language of
the statute. Prosecutors in at least two boroughs of New York
City have obtained indictments on hate crime charges in violent
muggings of elderly victims, where there is some evidence that
the perpetrator targeted the elderly so as to minimize the
possibility of resistance.147 In Queens, District Attorney Richard
Brown prosecuted several more female grifters like Miller, each
time charging larceny as a hate crime.148
Nevertheless, application of the Hate Crimes Act to
opportunistic bias crimes has not been limited to elderly
victims. In Queens, District Attorney Brown—apparently
144

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.40 (McKinney 2011).
Scott Shifrel, Call Elderly Scam a Qns. Hate Crime, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.),
Oct. 9, 2004, at 14 (calling the tactic “a novel strategy” and quoting Queens DA Richard
Brown as saying, “Such crimes of financial exploitation are commonly known as
‘sweetheart scams’ and are among the most devastating forms of elder abuse.”).
146
Gersh Kuntzman, ‘Golden Oldie’ Bilk Gal: I Did It, N.Y. POST, Oct. 15,
2005, at 5. Miller could have faced a maximum sentence of up to twenty-five years in
prison. See Shifrel, supra note 145.
147
See, e.g., Ikimulisa Livingston, 800G Rip-off of 93-yr.-old Is a Hate Crime,
N.Y. POST, Feb. 28, 2008, at 23 (Queens); Man Is Charged with Hate Crimes in Attacks
on 2 Elderly Women, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2007 (Queens); Melissa Grace et al., Thug
Chokes on His Tears; Granny-Bashing Ex-Con Says He Preyed on B’klyn Elderly to
Feed Crack Addiction, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Aug. 22, 2008, at 2; Webcrims Case Details
(on file with author) (Brooklyn). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in a similar
Manhattan case, the New York County District Attorney, Robert Morgenthau, did not
seek hate crime charges. Melissa Grace, Mugger of Elderly a Serial Thug, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), Aug. 27, 2009, at 29.
148
Ikimulisa Livingston, Teen Charged with $1M Love Scam, N.Y. POST, Oct.
6, 2006, at 27; Warren Woodbury, Jr. & Scott Shifrel, Lost Love and Out 300Gs; Nab
Woman in Grift Scam, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 7, 2005, at 8. In at least one other
Queens case, hate crime charges were applied to a scammer who, rather than preying
upon loneliness, preyed upon the perceived gullibility of the elderly, disguising himself
as a water man to gain entry to victims’ homes, then stealing their valuables. John
Sullivan, Imposter Sentenced for Burglaries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, at B4.
145

2011]

HATE IS ENOUGH

1627

among the most aggressive law enforcement officials when it
comes to section 485—charged the members of an alleged auto
insurance fraud ring under the statute, arguing that the
defendants targeted Asian-Americans in the Flushing section
of the borough.149 The district attorney’s theory was that the
defendants “created” phony accidents by deliberately colliding
with Asian drivers, selecting them based on the belief that the
language barrier made them easy targets and “that they were
bad drivers and that they would be blamed by police and
insurers for the accidents, instead of the culprits.”150
It was against this backdrop of inconsistent, and to
some degree experimental charging under the Hate Crimes
Act, that the attempted robbery of Michael Sandy took place.
The Kings County District Attorney, Charles Hynes—himself
the special prosecutor in a noted pre-Hate-Crimes-Act case of
racial animus151—characterized his office’s approach in the
Sandy case as pioneering. In a press release issued to announce
the indictment of the three Fox defendants, Hynes suggested
that his office’s use of the hate crime law in the case was
nontraditional.152 In interviews, officials in Hynes’ office told

149

Maria Alvarez, DA: Scammers Targeted Asians, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct. 31,
2008, at A52.
150
Id.
151
Hynes was the special prosecutor in the 1987 trial of a group of white men
who chased a black man to his death on a highway in the Howard Beach section of
Queens. Biography of Charles J. Hynes, KINGS CNTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
http://www.brooklynda.org/hynes/da_corner.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011); Denis
Hamill, Hell Night That Changed N.Y.C.: Atty’s on Both Sides Go Back Down Mean
Streets. Howard Beach 20 Years Later, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Dec. 17, 2006, at 22.
152
Press Release, Kings County Dist. Attorney’s Office, Kings County District
Attorney Charles J. Hynes Announces Indictments in Bias Murder: Plans to Apply LittleUsed Section of Hate Crime Statute (Oct. 25, 2006), available at http://www.brooklynda.org/
News/press_releases_2006.htm#056. The DA’s release, in fact, misstates the prosecutorial
approach by suggesting that some “little-used” section of the statute made the charge
possible in the case:
Typically, according to state law, Hate Crimes are charged when prosecutors
believe the defendants acted out of bias against the victims’ race, color,
national origin, ancestry, gender, religion, religious practice, age, disability or
sexual orientation. But the less used section of the law calls for Hate Crimes
to be charged when the defendant intentionally selects the person against
whom the offense is committed or intended to be committed based on a belief
about those same factors.
Id.

1628

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:4

news reporters that the approach was novel153 and the news
media portrayed it as such.154
Even defendant Fortunato’s unexpected trial gambit of
proving his own homosexuality by calling as witnesses three
sexual partners failed, in the end, to make a difference.155
Fortunato was convicted of second-degree manslaughter as a
hate crime.156 Nevertheless, in interviews with newspapers that
covered the trial, jurors said they obeyed the law as it was
explained to them—but disagreed with it.157
Since Fox, there have been a few other incidents of
relevance. In Suffolk County, Long Island, a Hispanic man was
charged under the hate crime statute for sending threatening
notes and hurling a log and a glass bottle at worshippers at a
church he once attended.158 The offender, Christhian Mungia
Garcia, allegedly told investigators he was angry at the church
for aggressively pressuring its congregation for donations.159
This particular fact pattern is likely quite unique, and—strictly
speaking—falls outside our discussion of opportunistic bias
crimes. This defendant’s motivation was not a belief that his
victim would make an easy, convenient, or resistance-free
target. However, the district attorney’s decision to pursue hate
crime charges reflect a strained reading of the statute. The
crime differed in a meaningful way from more prototypical acts
153

The author, who was a news reporter at the time of the case, had
conversations with members of Hynes’s office to this effect. The source of these
conversations is confidential.
154
Ginsberg & Celona, supra note 6; Clyde Haberman, An Easy Target, but
Does that Mean Hatred?, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, at B1; Bart Jones, Murder
Charges in Sandy Case; Using an Obscure Statute, Prosecutors Will Seek Murder as a
Hate Crime Charges on 3 Suspects, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Oct. 26, 2006, at A16.
155
Marzulli, supra note 13.
156
Inmate Information, N.Y.S. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONAL SERVS., http://
nysdocslookup.docs.state.ny.us/GCA00P00/WIQ3/WINQ130 (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
157
Michael Brick, To the Jury’s Regret, a Hate Crime Conviction, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2007, at B2 (Quoting a juror as saying, “By the letter of the law, Fortunato was
guilty, but none of us thought that he had any hatred or animosity toward
homosexuals,” and adding that the statute was “perhaps too broad.”); John Marzulli &
Scott Shifrel, 2nd Suspect Convicted in Gay Hate Slay, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Oct. 12,
2007, at 18 (Quoting jury foreman Eric Zaccar as saying, “I still don’t believe it’s a hate
crime but by the technicality of this ridiculous law . . . . It’s a good law when it applies
to fat white guys with baseball bats beating up a black man. But when it applies to one
gay person seeking out another gay person, it’s absurd.”).
158
Matthew Chayes & Elizabeth Moore, Cops: It Wasn’t Racial Bias; Charged
with Bias Crime Against Religious Practice; Suspect Was Upset He Was Rebuffed by
Church, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Sept. 6, 2009, at A14.
159
Id. (quoting the defendant as saying, in his statement to police, “I hate the
church . . . I want everyone to know that the church is only after their money and that
they should all leave the church and just read the Bible.”).

2011]

HATE IS ENOUGH

1629

of religious vandalism, where the perpetrator’s “hate” is based
purely on the religious identity of the members, rather than, as
here, a specific policy, position, or activity of the particular
religious institution. The soliciting of donations is a widespread
practice among religious institutions; to use it as the basis for a
hate crime charge is nearly as counterintuitive as charging a
hate crime in a hypothetical case where a perpetrator eggs a
church to communicate his disapproval of bingo night.
The other incident of relevance to this discussion
provides an example of the reverse phenomenon seen in the
church-harassment case and Fox—that of a district attorney
choosing not to bring hate crime charges where, at least by the
standards of other district attorneys, such charges would be
appropriate. On Sept. 2, 2006, Ricardo Salinas, a Mexican-born
cook at a Staten Island restaurant, was beaten and robbed by a
trio of teens.160 Salinas succumbed to a heart attack after the
assault.161 At arraignment, prosecutors, relying on statements
made by one defendant, John Messiha, said that another
defendant, Travis King, had suggested to Messiha and
codefendant Daniel Betancourt that they rob a Mexican.162
Nevertheless, the prosecutor did not seek, nor did the grand
jury hand up, hate crime charges against the defendants.163 A
spokesman for the District Attorney’s Office explained that the
office exercised discretion in not applying the hate crime
statute: “We saw it as a crime of opportunity, not a crime of
hate. If they saw another guy walking down the street with $20
in his hand, they might have robbed him first.”164

160

Mike Jaccarino & Ernie Naspretto, Murdered for $60; Wife Hears His Cries
for Help as Murdered S.I. Man Calls Home, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Sept. 4, 2006, at 7.
161
Peter Kadusin & Leo Standora, 3 Aimed to Rob a Mexican: DA, DAILY
NEWS (N.Y.), Sept. 6, 2006, at 8.
162
Id. (quoting Assistant District Attorney Alex Schapiro as saying, “The
defendants were playing video games and decided to rob somebody. They wanted it to
be a Mexican man and that’s when they went out and found Mr. Salinas.”); Criminal
Complaint at 2, People v. Betancourt, No. 2006RI007455 (Richmond Cnty. Crim. Ct.
Sept. 4, 2006) (attributing to defendant Messiha the statement, “Travis said we should
rob a Mexican. We were walking down Van Pelt [Avenue] and saw a Mexican. Travis
said to get him . . . .”).
163
Robert F. Moore, DA: A Crime of Greed, Not Hate, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Oct.
12, 2006, at 36 (quoting the DA, “[I]t is clear that the motivation for the attack on Mr.
Salinas was robbery, not ethnicity.”). The Daily News article incorrectly asserts that
prosecutors no longer believed King made the statement about robbing a Mexican. In
fact, this remained evidence in the case up to and including trial. Interview with
William Smith, Dir. of Pub. Info., Richmond Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, in Brooklyn,
N.Y. (Oct. 19, 2009).
164
Interview with William Smith, supra note 163.
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It is hard to find meaningful differences between Fox
and the Betancourt, King, and Messiha case. In both cases,
teenage perpetrators looking primarily for money decided to
rob someone. In both cases, the defendants decided to rob a
member of a particular group. In Fox, that plan stemmed from
a belief that a gay man would be an easier target, one less
likely to resist or report the crime. In the Staten Island case,
the exact motive for robbing a Mexican remains shrouded in
some uncertainty. Nevertheless, the district attorney’s facile
explanation that the motive remained “robbery, not ethnicity,”
does nothing to close the issue. Defendants could not plausibly
have targeted a Mexican victim without at least some reason. If
that reason was pure hate, the decision not to apply the statute
is inexplicable. But even if that reason turned out to have been
the belief that Mexicans—especially illegal laborers—carry
cash, then the case fits squarely within the Fox mold. In that
case, the decision not to charge can only be explained by the
District Attorney’s Office’s apparent rejection of the
applicability of the hate crime statute to opportunistic bias
crimes.
IV.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF POORLY DRAFTED STATUTES
AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS

That two district attorneys should reach opposite
determinations on cases so similar, and which took place
within five weeks of each other in the same year, indicates the
problems created by the Hate Crimes Act of 2000. The law’s
failure to clearly include or clearly exclude opportunistic bias
crimes has invited prosecutors to fill in the statute’s black holes
by exercising their own discretion. It is axiomatic that
prosecutors enjoy unreviewable discretion over decisions
whether to charge, and what charges to bring.165 However, that
discretion serves the public best when it is exercised in the
165

See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977) (“Judges are not
free, in defining ‘due process,’ to impose on law enforcement officials our ‘personal and
private notions’ of fairness and to ‘disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial
function.’” (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952))); People v. DiFalco,
377 N.E.2d 732, 735, 44 N.Y.2d 482, 486 (1978) (“The District Attorney has broad
discretion in determining when and in what manner to prosecute a suspected offender.”
(citing Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783)); Nieblas v. Kings County Dist. Attorney, 619 N.Y.S.2d
703, 703 (App. Div. 1994) (“It is well-settled that the decision whether to prosecute is
entrusted to the sole discretion of the District Attorney.”); People v. Harding, 355
N.Y.S.2d 394, 397 (App. Div. 1974) (referencing the “recognizedly unfettered discretion
of the District Attorney to prosecute or not to prosecute.”).
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context of a particular case presenting extraordinary
circumstances. It does not serve the public when that discretion
is exercised over so major a concern as determining the proper
scope of an important legislative act. However, this note does
not argue for a limitation of this discretion. Rather, it argues
that the legislature is ultimately responsible for directing this
discretion through carefully worded statutes.
The questions of whether opportunistic bias crimes
should be punished as harshly as crimes of true hate is beyond
the scope of this note. It is sufficient to note that colorable
arguments exist on both sides. On the one hand, the belief or
perception that certain groups make better crime targets can be
as pernicious and destructive as the belief that those individuals
are persons of lesser worth.166 In fact, such a belief can be more
harmful, because it provides a practical encouragement to
commit a crime against those persons. However, it should be
remembered that hate crime laws are not concerned with beliefs
per se, but rather concrete acts committed in connection with
beliefs.167 A crime committed for a practical reason—however
misinformed, prejudicial, or irrational that reason—tends not to
generate the same level of revulsion as a crime committed out of
pure hate, according to many commentators.168
In any event, the answer to the question is less
important than the basic imperative that the answer be clear
to law enforcement and the citizenry. What those on either side
of the crimes-of-opportunity/crimes-of-hate debate should find
patently unacceptable is the possibility that the legislature
failed to translate its intent accurately into law. In Fox,
prosecutors appeared to take just the opposite position—that
the legislature might enact a statute to prohibit a particular
species of conduct, but that by its plain language, that statute
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might properly be used to prohibit another related, but distinct,
species of conduct.169 That conclusion is troubling.
The research incorporated into this note raises
significant doubts about whether the legislature specifically
intended to proscribe crimes of opportunity under the Hate
Crimes Act of 2000. It shows that, at best, the legislature was
simply unaware of the crimes-of-opportunity/crimes-of-hate
distinction and never squarely addressed the issue. To be sure,
evidence exists, most notably, the existence of the Assembly
version of the bill, to suggest that the law was drafted
purposefully to sweep in those crimes of opportunity. But the
near absence of any mention of the issue in public discourse,
legislative documents, or floor debate suggests that even if this
were true, the vast majority of voting legislators perceived the
issue in broader strokes.170
Whether the legislative misfire discussed here rises to
the level of a major problem in construction of our criminal law
depends upon one’s perspective. The fact that some
opportunistic bias crimes may be punished as severely as pure
hate crimes is unlikely to stir much sympathy in the average
observer. First, the issue is limited, by definition, to a
particular subset of an already-rare breed of crime. Second, and
more importantly, any person prejudiced by this issue will
necessarily be a person not simply accused of a crime, but
already convicted of a crime, who now argues that he should
not additionally have been convicted of a hate crime. Put
differently, this is not a problem that can befall the average,
law-abiding, responsible citizen. It is a problem that can only
afflict a criminal. For that reason alone, it is unlikely to be
considered a major injustice.
Given these realities, the prospects for seeing the statute
applied only as envisioned by its drafters are dim. The cases
discussed herein show that, while some district attorneys will
exercise restraint in applying the statute, some will instead
169
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choose not only to apply it as written, but also to find novel and
innovative ways to do so. Significantly, those who do not exercise
restraint will find few checks—short of that exercised by the
voter—on their decision. As seen in Fox, courts will not—and
should not—step in absent a clear indication that a district
attorney is actually violating the language of a statute.171
The problem is not one with an easy solution. Given the
well-established discretion accorded prosecutors, a district
attorney may apply a statute like the Hate Crimes Act as
written; Fox demonstrated that a court will not force a
prosecutor to engage in a searching review of the legislative
history when a statute’s plain meaning is evident. Instead, the
legislature—having created the problem—is the only body that
can correct it. Sadly, it is a body unequal to the task. Even in a
well-functioning, productive legislature, an elected official
arguably gains no political advantage by amending the statute
in this fashion. In a legislature such as New York’s, where
political infighting,172 corruption,173 and deal making174 are the
norm, the prospects are even grimmer. Accordingly, unless
there is an astounding and unexpected surge in political
courage in Albany, the flawed statute—one that casts a wider
net than its authors intended—will remain the law.
Alex Ginsberg†
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